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THE U. S. S. R. AND FINLAND

O

N SEPTEMBER 29, 1939, the Soviet Union concluded
a mutual assistance pact with Esthonia which was implemented by the leasing of strategic bases on Esthonian
islands dominating the Gulf of Finland and the Gulf of Riga.
Thus in the midst of a dangerous war situation the Soviet
Union moved to preserve peace in the Eastern Baltic and
end long standing menaces to the security of its second largest
city and one of its chief industrial areas.
This pact was followed by similar pacts with Latvia and
Lithuania. In the pact with the' latter state, which unlike
the other Baltic states had never participated in anti-Soviet
attacks, the Soviet Union ceded the city and district of Vilno,
ancient Lithuanian capital, seized from Lithuania by Poland.
In addition to the security which these pacts brought to
the three Baltic countries, they gained ' distinct economic
advantages. Not only was their trade with the Soviet Union
increased at a time when the war had cut their trade with other
countries, but by getting access to the Soviet Baltic-White
Sea Canal and the Soviet Railway to Murmansk, they were
able to reach the Atlantic by a r'oute safe from war hazards.
The remaining sections of the edifice of East Baltic security
remained to be completed by a mutual assistance pact with
Finland. Occupying the entire northern shore of the Gulf
of Finland, and strategic islands in the center, Finland is in a
position to scuttle any plan for ensuring Soviet security. With
a width of forty-five miles the Gulf is at once too wide to be
commanded ' by batteries from the newly-acquired ice-free
Soviet bases on the southern shore and not wide enough for
the Soviet fleet to move from Kronstadt to these new bases
without exposure to submarine attacks and mine fields. A
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glance at the map will also show how Kronstadt, the fortress
covering Leningrad, is exposed to attack from the islands in
the eastern end of the Gulf. (See page 32.)
Thus, in the Gulf, Finland was in a position to nullify the
benefits secured by the mutual assistance pacts signed with
the other three Baltic states. On the land borders Finland
was similarly emplaced to threaten the security of Leningrad.
Only a small strip of land on the Karelian Isthmus, well
within range of Finnish batteries, separated Leningrad from
the Finnish border troops.
During the Civil War and intervention (1917-1920) this
constant threat from Finland prompted the Soviets to move
the capital from Petrograd to safer Moscow. But with its
huge population and its vital industries Leningrad, even with9ut a capital status, is too important to face such risks. As our
own diplomatic representative in Riga noted in 1920, any
Russian state, whatever its form of government, would sooner
or later have to rectify this situation. (See page 17.) And no
other major power would have tolerated it as long as the
Soviet Union did. The outbreak of the second World War,
and the efforts to turn it against the U.S.S.R., gave the problem of the defense of this vulnerable approach to Leningrad
a new urgency.

Negotiations With Finland
On October 7, 1939, in the spirit of the non-aggression pact
which it had signed with Finland, the Soviet Union invited
the Finnish Government to discuss a peaceful solution of these
problems. The answer of the Finnish Government was to
mobilize first and send a delegation afterwards. Such a general mobilization, always construed as an act of war, was a
flagrant breach of the Soviet-Finnish Non-Aggression Pact.
It was in this spirit that the Finnish G~vernment conducted
the negotiations throughout. The Soviet attitude, on the other
hand, was patient and conciliatory. Tne Soviet Government
waived its request for a mutual assistance pact such as had
4

been concluded with the other Baltic States. For every concession it requested, it offered more than balancing territorial
concessions elsewhere. It pared down its terms to the absolute minimum required for the security of Leningrad, of Murmansk and the Baltic-White Sea Canal-its own Panama
Canalln the North, through which it has access for its fleets
and its commerce to the Arctic and Atlantic Oceans, and
which is the main artery of the new world, being created in
the North by socialist enterprise and industry.
The negotiations were protracted for a month, with the
Finnish delegation confining itself to saying ((no" while the
Soviets made all the concessions. Since all the vital demands
of the Soviets were rejected, the negotiations broke down.
Making the ambiguous statement that ((circumstances" would
dictate which country would reopen negotiations, the Finnish
delegation went home.
The implications of this statement and of the Finnish attitude throughout were not lost upon the Soviet Government.
General Mannerheim had been unable to crush the revolutionary masses of his own little country without German
bayonets-a whole German army corps. It was not likely that
the delegates were speaking with only their own military
resources in view. It was clear that offstage there were
prompters-powerful forces with aims and motives of their
own. And it was because of the presence of these very forces
that the Soviet Union was determined to protect its security
once for all. Two things were made clear by the Finnish
drawing-out of the negotiations-the presence of that very
danger, and the fact that there was a play for time; that gave
notice that time was limited and that a decision must be made.

Caiander Takes the Offensive
Finland not only retained its unfriendly intransigeance but
had the effrontery to attack the Soviet mutual assistance pacts
with the other Baltic States. In a public address, former
Premier Cajander, to use The New York Times' characteriza5

tion of his remarks, ((expressed the deepest sympathy for
Esthonia, Latvia and Lithuania-(three prosperous states
which, after being independent nations, have suddenly become
ll?-ore or less dependent on Soviet Russia. Finland feels especially concerned for the fate of her dear sister nation Esthonia.' "
Any politically-minded person reading this speech was
prepared for startling developments. At the very time that the
Finnish Government was proclaiming its willingness to make
peace with its powerful neighbor it was making suspicious
overtures to Esthonia with whom it had long ago suggested
union, taking in the Leningrad area as the point 0 f fusion.
It was this that precipitated the storm of protest in the Soviet
press, that our press pretended to find so inexplicable. But the
Soviet Union knew what another Finnish premier had said
regarding itself and its ((dear sister nation Esthonia."
What the Cajander speech meant-whether it was to be
taken as the outburst of a diplomatic pyromaniac or as the
first evidence that Cajander had the backing of other nations
in his incendiary intervention in the good relations established
between the Soviet Union and the other smaller Baltic stateswas soon made clear.
Two days after these verbal fireworks of Premier Ca j ander,
there was artillery fire which resulted in thirteen casualties of
Red Army men in the suburbs of Leningrad. Then it was
made clear what Cajander's apparently mad s.tatement meant.
The class interests of the Swedo-Finnish ruling class were being placed above the life and liberty of the Finnish people.
This ruling class which had been selling Finland back and
forth throughout its history, from Sweden to Tsarist Russia,
from Tsarist Russia to Hohenzollern Germany, from Hohenzollern Germany to Britain, from Britain to Nazi Germany
and now back to Britain-was willing to drag Finland into
war rather than to loosen, even a little, its exploiting grip on
the Finnish masses.
Since then, the sudden offers of English aid, and the aid
~
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of other nations, aid that was conspicuously withheld from
Poland, is a significant revelation of the sinister situation
against which the Soviet Union has had to act.
When the Soviet Government, exasperated by Finnish
provocations, severed diplomatic relations, the Cajander Government went out of office. It was hoped then that the new
Government would be one with which the Soviet Government
could entertain new negotiations for a peaceable and complete settlement of the issues between the two Governments.
It appeared, however, that the rulers of Finland had turned
out the Cajander Government for fear that it would come to
a peaceful settlement after all. The change in Government
turned out to be a further provocation. The new Ryti Go~
ernment was a mobilization of known anti-Soviet politicians.
The Soviet Government then had no recourse but to turn
from that Government and open negotiations with the Finnish
People's Government established in T erioki. In its declaration to the Finnish people the T erioki Government scored
the readiness of the Finnish bourgeoisie to serve as a tool of
the ((imperialist enemies of the Finnish and Soviet peoples."
It condemned the rulers of Finland for having plunged the
fatherland into war with ((the great friend of the Finnish
people," the Soviet Union. In the critical situation it proclaimed it to be the right and duty of the masses of the
Finnish toiling people to take the fate of the fatherland into
their own hands. Their first act was to make a complete
and mutually advantageous settlement of all outstanding
issues between Finland and the Soviet Union.
The Helsinki Government in the meanwhile has shown its
dependence upon foreign support. As the December 1, 1939"
release of the McClure Syndicate points out:
CCAn ominous phrase Ctwo months' echoes through Finnish dispatches. Finland cannot hold out forever against Russia, but helieves she can hold out (two months.' This, it seems, is her function.
What does Britain expect in two months? Possibly a consolidation
of the Balkans through Turkey's good offices, while Moscow is busy
7

;n the north? Or a coup d'etat in Germany, engineered by Thyssen
and Schacht from exile--"both, incidentally, good friends of Montague Norman too? Or is the cryptic reference to the American Congress, which will have time to meet and act by the end of January?
Britain has a two months' plan which requires that the Finns tie
the Russians up that long."

THE PRESENT AND THE PAST
Two twin facts stand out in the history of Finland and
no propaganda smokescreens can erase them. The first is
that after seven hundred years of Swedish domination and
one hundred years of Tsarist Russian domination, without
even an attempt by the Swedo-Finnish ruling class of Finland
to fight for independence, Finnish inde¥>endence was finally
achieved through the Russian Revolution, under the official
signatures of Lenin and Stalin. The second is that while
General Mannerheim and the rest of his Swedo-Finnish confreres were loyally polishing the boots of Nicholas II, the
fight for Finnish freedom was led by the Social-Democratic
Party of Finland which, until most of its militant members
were butchered by General Mannerheim, was as revolutionary
as the party of Lenin. Thus it was the revolutionary workers
of Finland who fought for Finland's independence and the
revolutionary workers of Russia which bestowed it on them
in line with the Soviet policy toward nationalities, formulated
by Stalin.

The Swedo-Finns and the Finns
Today the Swedo-Finnish ruling class of Finland, many
of whom cannot speak a word of Finnish, are posing as the
champions of the Finnish people against the ((Russian invaders." Yet the unerasable historical record is that even
under Tsarist domination this Swedo-Finnish aristocracy, of
which General Mannerheim is a scion, continued to suppress
the Finnish language and culture. Ethnologically and lin8

guistically, the Finnish people, as distinct from their rulers, are
much closer to certain peoples of Northern Russia and Siberia
(hence the mad claims of Finnish imperialists to Russia ~~as
far as the Urals") than to their suddenly acquired ~~Nordic
cousins." In the Soviet fraternity of nations, where all races
are absolutely equal and it is no disgrace to belong to a ~~non
Aryan" race, the true cousins of the Finns-the Karelians, the
Mordvinians, the Ostiaks, the Kalmucks, the Samoyeds, the
Marii and kindred nations-do not have to hide their linquistic affinity to the Mongolian (Uralo-Altaic) family of languages.
Until Finland was conquered by ' Sweden, and Karelia by
the Russian city-state of Novgorod, the scattered Finnish
tribes roamed those regions without territorial or racial cohesion. Christianity came to the pagan Finns as it came to
the pagan Teutons-by the sword. In the end the Eastern
Finns in Karelia became Russified and Greek Orthodox, while
the Western Finns in what is now Finland became subjects of
Sweden, and Roman Catholics and Lutherans in succession.
Finland continued to be under Swedish domination from
1154 until its annexation by Tsar Alexander I in 1809. The
local autonomy which Finland enjoyed as a Grand Duchy of
the Swedish crown helped to give Finland a territorial unity.
But culturally and linguistically the Finnish nations was in
the process of being obliterated by the culture and language
of the Swedish ruling class. The Swedi.sh army of occupation
intermarried with the Finns and gradually a Swedish-speaking,
Swedo-Finnish colony was developed in Finland holding itself
conteIl1ptuously aloof from the Finnish masses like the Anglo-.
Irish colony in old Ireland.

The Finnish National Revival
The Finnish peasants did not al wa ys meekly submit to the
yoke of their Swedo-Finnish masters. In 1596 they rose
against their oppressors in a savage Jacquerie known as the
Club War. The revolt was drowned in blood.
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It is significant comment on bourgeois cCpatriotism" that
it was this same Swedo-Finnish ruling class which initiated
the movement for the separation of Finlanp from Sweden and
its annexation by T sarist Russia. This phenomenon becomes
less anomalous when the class motivation is analyzed. In the
heyday of Swedish monarchical power, Finland enjoyed a
high degree of local autonomy. In effect it meant that the
Swedo-Finnish ruling class of Finland was free to oppress the
Finnish masses without hindrance from Sweden.
In the eighteenth century when the Swedish Diet began to
wrest power from the Crown, a centralized regime on a class,
rather than on a regional, basis was instituted in the Swedish
kingdom. Concurrently trade was. increasing in Finland, particularly with England, stimulating the growth of a local
bourgeoisie that did not like the competition of the Swedish
bourgeoisie. As a result the Swedo-Finnish ruling class began
to :flirt with the idea of an autonomous Finland under the
suzerainty of Tsarist Russia. They looked enviously across the
Gulf of Finland to Russian-occupied Courland and Livonia
and hoped that they too would be allowed to exploit the Finnish peasantry as ruthlessly as the German Baltic barons were
allowed to exploit the Esthonian and Latvian peasants.
When in 1809 Napoleon invited Alexander ~ of Russia to
help himself to Finland in return for aid against Britain, the
Russian army was welcomed by the local Swedo-Finnish
aristocracy. In his book Finland, the historian ]. Hampdon
Jackson writes:
((When the Russian troops entered Turku, the capital, they were
met with a civic reception. Sweden's cause in Finland had been
betrayed hy the Sweda-Finnish gentry."

Alexander I was very generous-to the Swedo-Finnish aristocracy. He gave them the CCHome Rule" that they were
yearning for, the rule of the 10 per cent Swedo-Finns over the
90 per cent Finns.
The aim of the Swedo-Finnish ruling class to stamp out the
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Finnish lang~age in Finland was stubbornly resisted and in
the latter half of the nineteenth century a nationalist Finnish
revival, like the Neo-Gaelic movement in Ireland, took roots
among the Finnish masses and petty bourgeoisie, flowering in
a Finnish literary school. Aid came from an unexpected
quarter. Realizing that a Swedish-speaking Finland might
possibly rejoin Sweden, Alexander II became a patron of the
Finnish revival as a political measure.
At the turn of the century, Nicholas II, under the influence of the fanatical head of the Russian Church, Pobedonostsev, initiated the only Russian attempt to Russify Finland.

The Finnish Socialist Movement
Meanwhile a new power had arisen on the political horizon
of Finland, the Social-Democratic Party of Finland, which
grew from a membership of 8,300 in 1902, to a party which
won a clear majority in the Finnish Diet in 1916, the first
Socialist Party in the world to get a parliamentary majority.
This may be explained by the social c0mposition of the
rural population of Finland which in 1901 comprised 88 per
cent of the total. Only 111,000 families or less than a quarter
of the rural population owned any land at all; the rest were
tenant farmers; torpparits or sharecroppers, and landless agricultural laborers. It was this vast reservoir of rural exploitation which enabled the Socialist Party of a dominantly rural
country to win a majority in the Finnish Diet.
In 1905, when the first great revolutionary wave swept
through Russia, the Swedo-Finnish bourgeoisie remained loyal
to Tsarism. But the Finnish Social-Democratic Party rose to
the occasion and struck a blow for a free Finland, a democraticall y-elected Diet and for social reforms. A general strike
was so complete that even the local police went on strike.
All the Socialist demands were granted by the T sarist government. The Social-Democrats won 80 out of the 200 seats
in the first democratic Diet of Finland.
In the counter-revolutionary period which followed upon the
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1905 revolution, the national, social and political gains of
1905 were largely lost in Finland as in the rest of the empire.
But the militant Social-Democratic Party of Finland knew
that their time would come again and organized for the
occasion. In the 1916 Diet the Social-Democrats won 103
out of the 200 seats.

The Bolshevik Revolution Brings Finland
Its Independence
When the Tsarist regime was overthrown in March, 1917,
the Provisional Government grudgingly restored to Finland
the autonomy that the Social-Democratic Party won in 1905.
But both the Lvov and Kerensky Governments refused to grant
complete independence to Finland. The only Russian political
party that was in favor of granting complete independence
to Finland was the Bolshevik Party. Lenin always had a great
admiration for the spl~ndidly organized militant Social-Democratic Party of Finland, then in control of the Finnish Diet,
and knew that a · Socialist Russia would have nothing to fear
from an independent Socialist Finland. While he was still
abroad, in his Letters from Afar, he wrote: ((The Finnish
workers are better organizers; they will help us in this and, in
their own way, bring nearer the establishment of a Socialist
.
Republic."
In his speech on the National Question he attacked the
stand of the Provisional Government. ((We stand for giving
the Finns complete independence. That will insure their confidence in Russian democracy and when they are given the right
to secede they will not do so."
In Finland, meanwhile, the Finnish Social-Democratic Party,
which had been the sole champion of the Finnish people
against Russian Tsarism, foreseeing the inevitable drift of
Russia to a Socialist Revolution, was now becoming opposed
to a complete separation from Russia. For that very reason
the Swedo-Finnish bourgeoisie, which had enthusiastically
12

collaborated with a reactionary Russia in the past, was now
becoming rabidly separatist and anti-Russian.
But separation from a potentially Socialist Russia was only
part of the program of the Finnish bourgeoisie. The more
important part of its program was the organization of a
counter-revolutionary putsch to wrest the local government
from the S~cial-Democratic majority of the Diet and forcibly
suppress the Finnish Socialist movement and the Finnish
trade unions. In this the Finnish bourgeoisie were only emulating the example of the Kerenskys, Miliukovs, Kornilovs
and Kaledins in Russia .

.
The Fin.nish Counter-Revolution

White Guard units sprang up throughout Finland disguised
as cCfire brigades" and cCathletic societies." The revolutionary
Finnish Social-Democratic Party of 1917 was not caught napping. On October 20 the leaders of the Finnish Trade Unions
(solidly Bolshevist) announced:
((As the bourgeoisie is now feverishly arming its.elf against the
laborers in order to stifle their most important endeavors for reform,
the leaders are. of the opinion that in self-defense and to provide
against all contingencies, the lahorers should immediately raise corps
of Guards up and down the country."

In 1917 the bourgeois leaders vociferously denied that they
were arming, but in 1923 when they were flushed with success
at having suppressed the remnants of the revolutionary movement of Finland, they boastfully confessed the truth. A pamphlet (F inland's Civil Guards) published in English by the
White Guards declared:
«Happily enough at the end of Q'ctober and the beginning of
November, 1917, the central organization succeeded in importing
one shipload of rifles, cartridges, machine guns and pistols, altogether 6,500 rifles, 25 machine guns, 2,500,000 cartridges, 800
pistols and 5,500 hand g~en~des."

The boat referred to was the John Grafton commanded by
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a certain John Smith. The arms that were to be used to
massacre the militant workers of Finland came from the same
country which is now supplying arms to the Finnish fascists
to attack the Soviet Union. Yet Britain was at that time an
ally of Russia in the World War and Russia had not yet
signed a separate peace with Germany.
How bourgeois Finland won its C:C:independence"-from
Socialism rather than from Russia-can best be told in the
words of the Encyclopedia Britannica. Not that the Britannica
tells the whole truth about that most fateful period of Finnish
history, but even the half truths admitted in the Britannica
will be startling revelations to an American public which has
been blinded to the truth about Finland by a smokescreen of
lies in the press and on the radio.
((The Diet resolved that it alone was competent to pass l~ws in
Finland relating to home affairs and finance. This law of July 18,
1917, reflected the standpoint of the Social-Democratic majority

which w~s ready to recogniz.e Russian supremacy in military and
foreign affairs. The advent of the Bolsheviks to power deepened
the pro-Russian sympathies of the Finnish Social-Democrats while
the Swedo-Finnish and Finnish propertied classes sought to cut
adrift from Russia. On Decemher 6, 1917, the Diet and the now
bourgeois Senate drew up a declaration of independence which is
held to mark the hirth of Finnish freedom. The Bolsheviks on
January 4, 1918, declared that this step conformed to their policy .
. . . The Finnish Social-Democrats, almost all Maximalists (Bolsheviks), pinned their faith on the Muscovite connection. . . . A hurriedly organized White army under Baron Mannerheim proved
insufficient to maintain order. . . . Sweden refused to help but
Germany did not hesitate. They sent a division initially 12,000
strong under General Rudiger and General von Golz. The German
victory over the Reds contributed to Mannerheim's decisive victory
at Viborg April 28, 1918, and by June 27, 1918, 73,915 Red rebels,
including 4,600 women, were prisoners of war. But the cruelty of
the Red insurrectionists led to a White counter-terror. Some 15,000
men, women and children were slaughtered."

14

To this thread, supplied by the official organ of British
imperialism, one needs only string the following comments:

1. That the only democratically-elected government that
Finland ever had, in declaring itself independent from Russia,
freely and of its own volition recognized special Russian military and diplomatic rights exceeding those which the Soviet
Union is now asking from Finland.
2. That the Finnish so-called War of Independence of
1918 was no struggle with Russia but a civil war started by
the Finnish bourgeoisie, with foreign aid and instigation
against the legal Social-Democratic Government of Finland
for the purpose of crushing the dominant revolutionary Socialist Party and trade unions.
3. That Swedish money, arms and uvolunteers," in addition to German armies, intervened on the side of the White
Guards.

4. That the White-Guard putsch of the bourgeois minority
would have been summarily crushed by the Socialist majority
had there been no German intervention.
5. That in the heat of the first imperialist war when the
British, French and German armies were slaughtering each
other by the millions on the Western front, British and German imperialism were nevertheless willing to collaborate in
crushing Socialism in Finland-Britain by arming the Finnish
White Guard and Germany by sending an expeditionary force
to aid them.

6. That the Britannica figures of the White holocaust in
Finland are grossly underestimated, the figures reported in
the contemporary British liberal press being about 50,000
killed in the Civil War and about 30,000 executed in cold
blood, a total of 80,000 victims in a population smaller than
that qf Chicago. But even accepting the Britannica figure of
15,000 executions it would be equivalent proportionately to
150,000 executions in Spain and 400,000 in Germany.
15

Finland Becomes the First Fascist State

With the Social-Democratic majority of the Finnish Diet
either killed, or in exile, the fascist rump Diet called for new
elections in which all the workers and peasants who had resisted the White Guards (the Britannica underestimates it as
46 per cent of the electorate) were officially disfranchised.
This illegally-elected Diet is the parent of the present Finnish Government. One of the first acts of this fascist Diet,
presided over by the notorious anti-Soviet plotter Svinhufvud,
was to declare Finland a German protectorate and invite ,a
brother-in-law of the Kaiser, Prince Friedrich Karl of Hesse,
to become King of Finland. Thus the status of Finland for the
rest of the war was that of a willing ally of Germany; in
other words, an ((enemy country" so far as Britain, France and
the United States were concerned, whereas Russia, even after
the Treaty of Brest Litovsk, were merely neutral. Yet a British
apologist has this to say of Finland's pro-German policy in
1918: ((In asking for a German monarch the Whites were
putting Finland under the protection of the Power which was
predominant in the Baltic, and this after all was Finland's
traditional position."
Mannerheim's Role in the Allied Intervention

With the victory of the Allies it might normally be expected that the Finnish fascists would be penalized for having
bet on Germany. But Britain readily forgave General Mannerheim all his pro-German sins for his meritorious service in
massacring the militant working class of Finland. Besides,
the British had fresh work for General Mannerheim in his
own Hne-the crushing of the militant Russian working class
-and needed Finland as a base for their anti-Soviet military
and naval intervention.
The role of the Finnish fascists in the Russian Civil War
and Intervention has confused many historians. The Britannica records:
16

((When at the end of May, 1919, a British expeditionary force
under General Maynard reached Lake Onega, General Mannerheim
offered cooperation in return for Petrozavodsk [Soviet Karelia].
The offer being declined, a Finnish volunteer f.orce assaulted the
town nevertheless, but without success. Again, at the end of the
year, when General Y udenich marched on Petrograd, General Mannerheim sounded out the Allies on Finnish intervention."

The confusion of bourgeois historians over this period directly reflects the cross-purposes of anti-Soviet diplomacy during the intervention. The Finnish fascists, as the Britannica
testifies, were more than willing to offer their expert services
to help crush the young Socialist Republic. But they nursed
imperialist dreams (based on the racial and linguistic affinity
of the Finns to some of the Mongolian peoples of Northern
Russia) of a Greater Finland stretching to the Urals and
including Esthonia via Leningrad. The Poles had similar
dreams of a Greater Poland stretching across Byelo-Russia and
the Ukraine to the Black Sea.
On the other hand the White Russian generals, with whom
the British were chiefly cooperating, dreamed of a strong
Russian imperialist state, including the whole of the old Russian empire with all the States that had been severed from it
restored. In this the White Russian leaders had qualified
suppert from Britain and France and unqualified support
from the United States. As late as 1920, when our Government was considering de facto recognition of the Baltic States,
(with the exception of Finland, none of the Baltic States were
at that time recognized by the Allies; only the Soviet Union
against which they were fighting had given them full recognition) our special representative at Riga said in a dispatch
to the State Department:
~~The

leading men here (in the Baltic States) are under no illusion as to the future relation of these States to Russia, and realize
full well that with an orderly well-established Government in Russia
the Baltic provinces will again become part of what will probabl,·
be a federated Russia."

17

Why the Finnish Rulers Made Peace
With the Soviet Union
This prospect ~f being returned to (an orderly wellestablished"-i.e., capitalist-Russian government was the
nightmare that haunted the dreams of the Finnish fascists
while they were participating in the interventionist campaigns
against the first Socialist Republic. It is true that Britain
and the United States were liberally paying them for their
services in the ((War to Make the World Safe Against Socialism" by generous loans which were disguised subsidies.
(The present Finnish «war debt" to the United States, of
which the American public has heard so much, was one of
these «loans.") But it was a war in which it might be as dangerous for the Finnish fascists to win as to lose. They knew
that no capitalist Russia -would permit itself to be cut off from
the Baltic or tolerate a frontier twenty miles from Petrograd.
Like his disciple Stalin, Lenin was not at all averse to signing treaties with states which were the prototypes of fascism,
providing Socialism gained by the transaction. He cleverly
pIa yed on the suspicion between the White Guard Finns and
the White Guard Russians and broke the anti-Soviet united
front by inducing Finland to sign a treaty of peace with the
Soviets in the fall of 1920. But the Finnish fascists, knowing
Soviet Russia's desperate need for peace, compelled Russia
-to cede to Finland the Pechango district settled by Russians
from Medieval Novgorod and containing Russia's only icefree port on the Arctic. Finland never had had any frontage
.on the Arctic. This province, which was never part of Finland, as any pre-war map of the Grand Duchy of Finland
.shows, gave Finland its present outlet on the Arctic. It also
gave the International Nickel Co. one of the richest nickel
deposits in the world. The Finnish Government is clamoring
-that the cession of a few square miles on the Karelian Isthmus
and the Hangoe and Rybachi Peninsulas would violate its
integrity, but it is silent about the fact that its sacred
18

territory includes a who.le admittedly Russian province.
The Treaty of Dorpat by which Finland gained the Province of Pechango only whetted the appetite of the Finnish
fascists. The following year Finnish ((volunteers," initiating
the technique which Mussolini and Hitler were to imitate in
Spain, invaded Soviet Karelia. The attempted putsch failed
and the volunteers were driven back to Finland. But the
Finnish fascists continued to nurse their pipe dream of a
Greater Finland-((stretching to the Urals."
IIDemocratic" Finland
In the post-~ar years Finland, like Poland, went through
the formality of becoming a ((democracy." But behind the
facade of ~(democracy," though Finnish cahinets came and
went, there loomed the figure of General Mannerheim, as
the figure of General Pilsudski loomed behind all Polish
governments during his lifetime. And General Mannetheim's
power was not based on the mere prestige of being an ((elder
statesman" or the ((savior of his country."
Mannerheim's power rested on the Civic Guard.
((This body," says J. Hampdon Jackson in his Finland, (twas a
survival of the White Guard of 1918 which had been given legal
recognition and a State subsidy under the Republic, on the understanding that it would act as a territorial militia to guard the country against foreign invasion and Communist conspiracy. It~ numbers
had grown to no less than 100,000 men and its officers were in
close touch with those of the regular army."

The regular Finnish army numbers only 28,000. It is a
significant comment on the fascists' distrust of the Finnish
masses that, instead of relying on a regular army to defend
its borders and maintain order, the Finnish Government has
to maintain an army of 100,000 storm troopers to guard
against a ((Communist conspiracy" in a country with onetwentieth the population of Germany.
The Finnish ((democracy" outlawed the Communist Party
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from the very beginni~g, but it permitted the existence of a
Social-Democratic Party just as the Hungarian dictator
Horthy permitted it in White Hungary. When the emasculated Social-Democratic Party developed a Cemmunistic Left
wing calling itself the Finnish Labor Party, which won 27
seats in the elections of 1922, the Finnish fascists dropped
the mask of Hdemocracy," suppressed the Labor Party as
Communist and threw its 27 deputies into prison.
The militants changed their name and by 1930 there was
another Left party in the political arena with 23 seats in
the Diet. In 1930 the Finnish fascists acted again, forming
the notorious Lappo movement, an organization of Finnish
kulaks from the district of Lappo, to ((force" the Government to act against the Communists and trade uniGns. The
Government of the anti-Soviet plotter Svinhufvud, which had
itself connived at the Lappo putsch, pretending to yield to it,
suppressed the new party and arrested its 23 deputies.
But the Finnish fascists never had any reason for suppressing the regular Social-Democratic Party of Finland that had
developed into a party which would have made the butchered
Finnish Social-Democrats of 1918 turn in their graves. Nor
did the fascists do anything to alleviate the land hunger of
the landless Finnish peasantry and the oppression of the
Finnish proletariat that was the chief ((Communist propaganda."
In 1922 a government in which the Social-Democratic Party
participated (headed by Premier Kallio, now President of
Finland) made a pretense at land reform and ((expropriation
of the large estates." The land laws which it passed, the Lex
Kallio, were a mockery of the needs of the Finnish peasantry.
((In the case of 500 acres and under there could be no expropriation; in estates of 1,250 acres the maximum with which
landlords cpuld be forced to part was 62 Yz acres; only in
estates of over 1,250 acres could expropriation reach the legal
limit of 50 per cent of the uncultivated land." Expropriation,
be it explained, meant that the landlords were to be liberally
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paid by the State in Government Bonds bearing 7 per cent
interest; and the peasants were to repay that money to the
State at the rate of 7 per cent per annum of the cost price,
the new cottagers (the landless, houseless farmhands ) paying
9 per cent.
On such terms it is obvious that only a small pe~centage of
the impoverished landless peasantry were able to take advantage of the Lex Kallio. More than half of the Finnish peasantry is still landless. This is not a disturbing phenomenon
to the Finnish timber barons, lords of Finland's largest industry. It means there is a large class of landless agricultural
laborers who lose their means of subsistence during the winter,
insuring a plentiful supply of cheap labor during the lumbering season. And the Finnish trade union movement which
has been crushed by the fascists every time it showed signs of
recovering from the massacre of 1918 (in 1923 and again in
193"0), and has since been further weakened by the reactionary leadership of the present Social-Democratic Party, is in no
position to protect these exploited workers.
A special U.S . .Department of Commerce bulletin of November 30, 1939, declares in part:
«Trade unions, although they have played some part in wage
disputes in Finland, have little influence in comparison with the
trade unions in the Scandinavian countries and the organized lahor
movement is not highly developed."

And this in a country where a so-called Socialist Party
is by far the largest political party, with 84 out of the 200
seats in the Diet. The much touted Finnish cooperative is an
organization controlled by the Finnish kulaks, a Finnish edition of the Associated Farmers of California.

Preparations fo-r a New Intervention
But the Finnish fascists had other interests. Until Nazi
Germany took their place, Finland, Poland and Rumania
were regarded as the spearheads of the contemplated Anglo21

French attack on the Soviet Union that was to have ~en
launched in 1930. Defense against this attack, delayed by the
world depression, was a factor in rushing the completion of
the First Five-Year Plan.
With the emergence of Nazi Germany and the consequent
threat to Poland and Rumania, the participation of these two
countries i~ the anti-Soviet drive became less certain. But
never that of Finland. The Finnish ((democracy" turned to
Nazi Germany like a flower to the sun and never wavered in
its loyalty until the rude shock of the Soviet-German NonAggression Pact. Only the other day T he New York Times
editorially reproached Hitler for Hbetraying his Finnish friend
and protege."
At a meeting in Rominten, East Prussia, in 1935, plans for
an attack on the Soviet Union were discussed. Goering represented Germany, General Mannerheim represented Finland,
Prince Radziwell represented Poland and Premier Goemboes
represented Hungary. The London Times (October 15,
1935), said of the meeting that not only air armaments had
been discussed but that naval and military ideas had been
exchanged, and ((Finland (whose strategical position for naval
operations is talked of) and even Rumania have been drawn
in. Even Japan is suspected of figuring in these dreams of
the future." During this period Germany took a hand in
fortifying Finland for an eventual anti-Soviet attack. Finland, all told, has an estimated airdrome space ten times her
own requirements and adapted for use by foreign powers.
So long as the post-war status quo was maintained in the
Baltic, the Soviet Union accepted the precarious position of
Leningrad, its chief sea outlet and military key to all of
Northern Russia. The Soviet Union knew that the East
Baltic countries were economic colonies of British imperialism
-its creatures and its tools. But it was reassured by the
distance that separated British imperialism from its dangerous tools. With the re-arming of Germany under the Nazis,
a re-arming fostered by Britain for its own purposes, the situ22

ation in the Baltic was radically altered so far as the Soviet
Union was concerned.
The Soviet Union was well aware of the fact that
not only its chief sea outlet but the entire Soviet North,
which was connected to Leningrad by the great Baltic-WhiteSea Canal, was at the mercy of any great power that controlled the Baltic States. And there was no doubt about which
great power was the preference of these States. The Baltic
States themselves made it brazenly clear. As recently as last
summer, during the negotiations for a proposed Anglo-FrenchSoviet Alliance to halt Nazi aggression, The New York
Times was full of the iterations of the Governments of Finland, Latvia and Esthonia about preferring Nazi Germany
to Communist Russia in a crisis, just as the Polish landowners.
went down in history as preferring Nazi conquest to permitting the Red Army to pass through their Ukrainian and
Byelo-Russian estates.
The sudden desire of Finland to fortify the Aland Islands.
dominating the northern Baltic was a concrete instance of this
preference which the Soviet Union could not ignore. It was,
the Anglo-French refusal during the Anglo-French-Soviet
negotiations to accede to Soviet demands for measures to insure against foreign control of the strategic Baltic States
which helped to convince Soviet diplomacy that Chamberlain's.
anti-Nazi protestations were not genuine "and that his real.
purpose was still the organization of a four-power pact against
the Soviet Union. Finland now announces that the Aland
Islands, which it had pledged itself not to fortify, in accord
with a League of Nations decision, are already partly fortified.
Through the Soviet-German Non-Aggression Pact the attempt to organize an anti-Soviet-London-Berlin alliance was
temporarily thwarted. But the position of the Soviet Union
in the Baltic remained precarious. Leningrad, which with
the surrounding . regions is one of the vital Soviet industrial
centers, remained exposed. A successful surprise thrust at
Leningrad through the Finnish Gulf, which was controlled
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up to the very gates of Leningrad by States that had already
served as bases for anti-Soviet adventures, might cut the country in two. In a period of imperialist war, with powerful
belligerents watchful to take advantage of every cqanging
situation, the Soviet Union could afford no risks.
A warning of what might happen was given in the escape
of an interned Polish submarine, with the connivance of the
Esthonian Government. A Soviet ship was sunk and revealed
bow easily Soviet shipping could be blocked in the narrow
Gulf of Finland.

Bolting the Door on Intervention
Then and there the Soviet Union decided to stabilize finally
the Baltic situation by declaring what amounts to a Soviet
Monroe Doctrine over the Gulf of Finland and its Baltic
approaches. This called for military, naval and aviation
bases; and just as the United States leased Guantanamo Bay
from the sovereign state of Cuba and the Panama Canal
Zone from the sovereign state. of Panama, giving all the
Americas security, so the Soviet Union, for the protection of
the entire East Baltic area, leased bases from Esthonia, Latvia
and Lithuania. But there is this difference. The action of the
Soviet Union has nothing in common with the imperialist
exploitation which American business interests have carried on
behind the cloak of the Monroe Doctrine.
These agreements were peacefully negotiated and accepted
by Esthonia, Latvia and Lithuania with satisfaction because
of the economic advantages and the security achieved for
them through these pacts. To complete the process the
U.S.S.R. opened similar negotiations with the Finnish Government.
A peaceful agreement was desired not only by the Soviet
people, but by the Finnish people, and the people of Esthonia,
Latvia and Lithuania who did not wish to see their newlya.chieved security menaced by an Achilles heel in Finland.
But the rulers of Finland, acting as they have done before,
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in alliance with foreign interests against the interests of the
Finnish people, preferred the bloody gamble of war to the
course of peaceful negotiation. They preferred to try to keep
Finland as what the London Times had declared it to be in
1919: ((The key to Petrograd; and Petrograd is the key to
ALTER BRODY
Moscow."

•
FINLAND'S RULERS
Shortly before the outbreak of the war between Germany
and the Allies an illuminating book, called Tory M. P., appeared in England.
The book analyzed the financial connection, the social ties,
the club affiliations and the publicly expressed opinions of a
considerable number of the Tory Members of Parliament,
whose party has openly ruled England since the betrayal of
Ramsay MacDonald. What emerged from this study was a
sort of group portrait of the British ruling class which revealed its fascist face and made understandable its readiness
to sacrifice the small European peoples and finally its own
people to its class imperialist interests.
A similar study of the leaders of the Finnish ruling class
would be of equal value here. We have not the space here
for a detailed analysis, but sufficient facts are available concerning leading members of the present rulers of Helsinki to
make their class connections clear, and explain their readiness
to sacrifice the Finnish people to their class interests.
Let us begin with the present premier, Risto Ryti. While
the White Terror in Finland was still at its height in 1919
he became a deputy to the Finnish Diet. In 1921 he was
appointed Finance Minister. In 1923 he became the head of
the Bank of Finland and has remained at its head ever since.
United Press dispatches refer to him as an ((international
banker connected with leading banking circles in London
25

and Wall Street and a friend of Montague Norman, head of
the Bank of England." At the London Economic Conference
in 1933 this representative of an ttindependent power" voted
loyally for Britain on every issue. He holds a British honorary title, Knight Commander of the Royal Victorian Order.
The New York Evening Post, December 1, 1939, commented:
. ((The British Crown confers such honors only on foreign royalty
or on prominent individuals who have earned the gratitude of the .
British Government for being unusually cooperative. Ryti rated his
title because as Governor of the Bank of Finland he worked hand in
hand with the Bank of England. He kept Finnish currency closely
tied to the pound sterling."

Former Prime Minister Eljas Erkko is a rich man by inheritance who has added to the family fortunes. He is the
owner of one of the biggest Finnish newspapers, The Helsinki Sanomat. In 1918 he was an officer of the White Guard,
the Finnish counterpart of the Storm Troopers, which has
kept Finland in a vigilante atmosphere ever since 1918. Although he has always had a pro-British orientation he had no
objections to bringing in German soldiers to help crush the
Socialist Republic established in independent Finland.
The political party to which he belonged-the Progressive
Party-has had a liberal wing and a reactionary wing. Erkko
is one of the leaders of the latter. He has been a close coworker of T. M. Kivimaki, Prime Minis~er in the pr.o-fascist
administration of President Svinhufvud, just as he has been
a bitter opponent of Holsti, who belonged to the liberal wing
of his party. Holsti, as the first foreign minister in the Caj-ander cabinet, won the hatred of Erkko by advocating friendlier relations with the Soviet Union and admitting, on a visit
to Moscow, that Finland owea its independence to the Bolsheviks . . Erkko forced Holsti's resignation and became Foreign Minister in his place.
Vaino Tanner, Ryti's Foreign Minister, is a Social-Democrat. He has followed the compromising policy that has
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disgraced the Social-Democrats everywhere. The Social-Democrats have, from the beginning of Finland's independence,
been the largest party in the country; but after the Mannerheim butchery of its predominantly Bolshevist membership
in 1919 they offered no resistance to reaction and have made
compromises with Finnish fascism. During the worst period
of the Lappa (Finnish fascist) drives, Tanner placed the responsibility for the outrages on the chief victims-the Communists. He defended the inaction of the Finnish Government
during the outrages in these terms: ((The Social-Democrats
consider that the Government has no other way out, for who
could expect it to dispatch troops to protect Communist printing plants?" At another time he made the statement that
((The Social-Democrats pursue the same aims as the Lappo
movement."
"
The military head of the Government is General Carl Gustave Mannerheim, to whom the Finnish people gave the name,
((The Butcher." Member of the old Swedish aristocracy that
still strongly tinges the upper class of Finland, he had a high
position at the court of Tsar Nicholas II, and was one of the
two "officers who escorted the Tsar at his coronation. Following the bloody suppression of an uprising in Persia Mannerheim received recognition as a butcher for imperialism by a
gift of a golden sword from the Tsar. Mannerheim served
"the Tsar again in the Russo-Japanese and the World War.
When Finland won its independence and a Socialist government was established, Mannerheim headed the White counterrevolution, and with the help of a German army he destroyed
the young democracy of Finland. A German prince was appointed king but never reigned, the Allied victory making this
unfeasible. Mannerheim acted as regent, until the ((republic"
which he has controlled ever since, in Pilsudski style, was
established in 1919.
, Mannerheim cooperated "with the Russian White Guard
General Y udenich, who was supported by England, in the
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attack upon Petrograd and later organized the attack on
Soviet- Karelia and was the central figure in all anti-Soviet
aggression plans. He won his butcher's title during the White
Terror in 1918-19, when some 30,000 workers were killed and
90,000 were put in concentration camps. The cruelties he
practised shocked even the capitalist world, which now conveniently forgets them. In the Mannerheim blood debauch
even schoolboys were executed at his orders.
When after ten years the Finnish labor movement revived,
Mannerheim was behind the organization of the Finnish fascist Lappo movement which by lynching and destruction,
winked at by the Government, again destroyed working class
organizations and newspapers.
These four figures are a representative sampling. It remains
to be noted that in the reactionary Ryti cabinet the Minister
of Labor is the banker, R. von Fiandt.

•
STATEMENTS BY LEADING ENGLISHMEN
GEORGE BERNARD SHAW

((No power can tolerate a frontier from which a town such
as Leningrad could be shelled when she knows that the power
on the other side of the frontier, however small and weak it
may be, is being made by a foolisp government to act in the
interests of other great powers menacing her security.
((Finland would probably not have refused the Russian
offer had she been acting on her own or in her own interests,
but Russia believes that Finland thinks she has the backing
of America and other Western powers."
Asked, ((what conceivable defense can you make for this
Soviet attack on Finland?" Shaw replied without hesitation:
uI think the explanation is perfectly simple. Finland had been
misled by a very foolish government. She should have ac28

cepted Russia's offer for the readjustment of territory. She
should have been a sensible neighbor."
He said the Finns obviously believed that they had the
support of the United States or they would not have taken
the stand they did against a nation so much stronger.
((It is not at all a question of Russia, a great power, attempting to subject Finland, which is a small power," he said. HIt
is a question of Russia seeing to her own security. In Russia's
view Finland can have no defensible objection to the carrying
out of the exchange of territories for which Russia askedunless she is allowing herself to be used by America or another
Western Power.
((There can be no possibility of Finland planning any attack on Russia by herself, nor would any of the territories
which Russia asked her to transfer enable her alone to defend
herself effectively against Russia."-London Daily Mail,
Dec. 2.
VERY REVEREND HEWLETT JOHNSON, DEAN OF CANTERBURY

«(It would have been wisdom and kindness on our part if
we had urged Finland to meet Russia's desire to remove the
possibility of guns placed only twenty miles away from the
heart of the area which possesses a quarter of her industrial
activities.
((I deplore the situation which might have b.een wholly
avoided, together with the' war itself, had we not spurned
Russian friendship and thwarted her efforts to make the
League of Nations a success.
((Russia feared with reason a united Western attack. We
through many years desired Germany to be the spearhead of
that attack. Man¥, influential persons still desire and work
for it. Russia knows that."
H.

G.

WELLS

«There is much to be said for the preventive sectlrity measures being taken by the Soviet Government."
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SIR STAFFORD CRIPPS, M.P.

((In the long run, I am convinced, it is of supreme import!lnce to the workers all over the world that a strong and
powerful Russia should survive.
((And I, for one, see no reason for blaming Russia, in a
situation into which she has been driven by the capitalist governments of the ~orld, for taking every step to · strengthen
her position.
~(But for the German Nazi influence in Finland and the
anti-Soviet feeling stirred up, it is probable that the exchange
of territory would have been ac~epted and everyone \vould
have commented on how sensible it was.
~~Now, naturally, all of Russia's enemies talk about the
sacredness of Finnish democracy, not because they love democracy but because they hate Russia."
CAPTAIN

HARRY

GRENFELL,

M.P. '

HThis government [England] has already made secret commitments "7ith Esthonia and Finland for the use of the airdromes in those countries for British aircraft operating against
the U.S.S.R. . . . The commitments appear to have been in
existence at least ten years." -Labour Monthly, June, 1939.
JOSHUA WEDGEWOOD, LABOR M.P.

~(Mannerheim

crushed in blood the revolt of the Finnish
workers and farmers in 1918 against the dictatorship of the
White Guard Finnish generals, bankers and landlords. . . .
(~Nonetheless Mannerheim continues to rule Finland.
Neither from a 4umanitarian viewpoint nor from considerations of liberty can one regret the changes which will lead to
Mannerheim's removal."-London News Chronicle, December 9, 1939.
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WORLD. WIDE ATTACK ON THE U.S.S.R.
INTERVENTION-I 9 I 7-1939

F

ROM the moment the Soviets took power, the forces of
world imperialism lined up to destroy the first Socialist
Republic. Internal divisions -among these forces have prevented a united attack, and the inherent powers of growth
and progress in the Soviet Union have strengthened it continuously as its opponents have grown weaker. Nevertheless,
though it has taken new forms, that war has never stopped.
Fourteen countries participated in armed intervention to
overthrow the Bolsheviks. Counter-revolutionary generals who
found no support within Soviet Russia were supplied by the
Allies with money, material and munitions. But armed intervention and counter-revolution failed. The people's will prevailed. So new methods were sought to fight the Soviets.
The anti-Soviet ring used starvation as _one of its weapons.
By blockade they sought to prevent the Soviets from building a stable state. By setting up a cordon sanitaire in the
Baltic they sought to choke Socialism at home and keep it
from spreading abroad. By the organization of terrorism,
assassination, sabotage, they sought to destroy it from within.
By the wildest forgeries they sought to discredit the Soviet
Government and to keep it an outlaw in the society of nations.
By an unceasing campaign of lies and vilification they sought
to blind the world to Socialist progress and achievements.
Turning their attention to the grooming of other powers
for an anti-Soviet drive, British and French imperialism helped
to re-arm Germany, and by their hypocritical unon-intervention" policy encouraged Berlin, Rome and Tokyo to seize Manchuria and cont~nue the dismemberment of China; and to
destroy the independence of Ethiopia, Austria, Spain, Czecho31
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slovakia, Albania, Memel. They expected their fascist Frankenstein to turn then against the Soviet Union and engage it
in a mutually destroying combat.

The Soviet-German Non-Aggression Pact
Upsets Intervention Plans
Meanwhile, however, the Soviet Union struggled valiantly
for the peace it needed ' to complete the building of Socialism,
and to save the workers of the world from a new blood bath.
But the forces of peace and progress within the imperialist
nations were themselves too weak and divided to prevail over
their reactionary governments. When .it became clear that
the British and French Governments, under the cover of peace
negotiations, were still working to turn fascist aggression
against the land of Socialism, the U.S.S.R. took the only
possible alternative. It concluded a Non-Aggression Pact
with Germany, smashed the Berlin-Rome-Tokyo Axis, and
shattered the whole structure of anti-Soviet strategy.
Great Britain and France then declared war against Germany. The Soviet leaders knew this was not the war for which
'Chamberlain and Daladier had planned. The next phase of
.Allied strategy soon became apparent-setting up a new
. government in Germany which would carry out the role as:signed to Hitler; and finding other nations to act as catspaws.
If all else failed" there remained the possibility of turning their
-own guns against the Soviet Union.
By another swift and brilliant stroke, the Soviet Union
_moved into Eastern Poland when the Polish Government,
Jacking support ~t home and not receiving the support prom:ised by Britain, lcollapsed. This move cut off Hitler's drive
down through Southeastern Europe. It cut off his approach
-to the Soviet Union through the Baltic. It liberated 13,000,·000 oppressed White Russians, Ukrainians and Jews, and
~xtended the area of Socialism and peace.
Followill:g this the Soviet Union secured itself against pos34

sibility of invasion through the Baltic by the pacts with
Esthonia, 'Lithuania and Latvia. A similar pact with Finland
would have brought complete security for the Soviet Union
and for the whole East Baltic region. When Finland refused to grant even the minimum Soviet requirements, it became clear that it was not acting alone and that the forces of
world imperialism were making a final desperate effort to
keep open this last avenue for invasion of the Soviet Union.

The Role of Finland in Intervention
It was not nlittle Finland" with its .3,670,000' inhabitants
that menaced the mighty Socialist country of 183,000,000.
It was and is the combined anti-Soviet forces throughout the
world, determined to destroy the workers' and farmers' state,
dail y increasing in might and influence.
To understand this it is helpful to examine the special role
assigned to Finland in the succession of plots to destroy the
Soviet Union. Particularly illuminating are the volumes issued
by the State Department, Foreign Relations, 1918, Russia,
Vols. I and II and Foreign Relations, Russia, 1919, from which
the quotations in the following pages are taken.
These volumes reveal that while never assuming as aggressively hostile an attitude as the British, the United States
tailed along after the British throughout the whole intervention period, permitted the slaughter of hundreds of American
and Russian soldiers in a lawless, undeclared war against the
Government which had the support of the people, while supplying arms, food and materials to the counter-revolutionary
forces, repudiated and defeated by the Russian people.
.With regard to Finland, the volumes reveal that American
representatives opposed its independence under the regime of
the Provisional Government and supported its independence
after the establishment of the Soviet regime in Russia-and
then only after the Finnish reactionaries were in the saddle.
Thus, on July 24, 1917, we find North Winship, American
Consul at Petrograd, reporting to. the State Department on
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the results of what he terms a ((mutinous rising" of the Bol·
sheviks on July 16, 17, 18:
C(A further evil result of the mutiny lies in the excuse it gave the
Social-Democrtic majority of the Finnish Seim to pass its law declaring Finland's independence of Russia in all respects except as to
foreign affairs and the military necessities of war."

Two months later David R. Francis, last American Ambassador to Tsarist Russia, cabled to the Secretary of State
that the situation in Finland was bad. The army and fleet
were refusing to obey the orders of the Government to prevent
sessions of the Diet. ·
While Ambassador Francis had cabled for and secured
prompt recognition of the Provisional Government, when the
Bolsheviks took power he urged the United States Government to take no action that could in any way be construed as
recognition of the new regime. He even interfered openly
in the affairs of the Soviet Government, attempting to incite
the people against it: ((A powerful enemy is at your gates.
A desperate foe is sowing the seeds of dissension in your
midst.... I appeal to you to be watchful of your true interests, and I make this appeal on behalf of my Government
and my people...."
On March 3, 1918, the Soviet Republic was forced to sign
the robber peace of Brest-Litovsk with Germany to save the
Revolution.
Germany, in violation of the terms of the treaty, advanced
against the Soviet Republic, in cooperaton with Finland.
During the next few months reports by American representatives to the State Department contained repeated rumors
of ~n impending German-Finnish advance into Murman Peninsula. This caused consternation among the Allies chiefly
because their own troops had been stationed there, on the
pretext of protecting the Murmansk Railroad. Reporting these
rumors Ambassador Francis added: ((Finland is still covetously endeavoring to secure more Soviet territory."
36
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American Armed Intervention

June of 1918 found the American Ambassador still wishfully prophesying the quick collapse of the Soviet Government, striving to .make his prophecy come true by supporting
anti-Soviet movements and violently agitating against Ameri-can recognition of the Soviets.
In July, DeWitt C. Poole, United States Consul in Mos<:ow, telegraphed the Secretary of State in Washington urging
~(immediate intervention in Siberia for the purpose of supporting the Czechoslovaks and the new Siberian Government."
The sequel was the dispatch in August of the ill-fated American military expedition of 7,000 men to Siberia. The story of
Siberian intervention has been told fully by General William
S. Graves, its commander, in his America's Siberian Adventure. General Graves himself sought valiantly to carry out the
ostensible purposes of the expedition, which were to help
hring the ·Czechoslovak deserters from the Austrian army to
the western front, and to protect Allied supplies. Actually he
found himself expected to help the Czechs wage war on the
Bolsheviks, to aid Japan in cutting off the Soviet . Far East,
.and to be a party to the counter-revolutionary attempts of the
notorious scoundrel, Semionov.
The occupation of Archangel by the Allied forces took
place on August 2. The local Soviet was deposed and the
counter-revolutionary ((Supreme Government of the Northern Region" headed by T chaiko\vsky was set up. Ambassador
Francis had already moved his embassy to Archangel in defiance of Soviet requests to come to Moscow.
Ambassador Francis cabled to Secretary of State Lansing:
((N ew Government claims jurisdiction over sill provinces, but freedom of action limited exclusively to territory occupied by Allied
forces. . . . British military complain because some Russians suspicious of British and French ·intentions and resent foreign domination. . . . I think new government should be encouraged and
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strengthened in every way possible, as its ov·e rthrow would prolong
civil dissension and greatly strengthen Bolsheviki and perpetuate
Soviet Government ...."

Later Francis reported that this Government ((would not
have succeeded if the Allied forces had not landed, neither
would it survive if Allied troops were taken away...."
On September 4, 4,800 American troops on three transports
arrived at Archangel to help this counter-revolutionary ((government" of the North in its attempts to overthrow the Soviets which came to power by the will of the Russian people.
When the local population rose against the ((Supreme
Government of the Northern Region," the Allied Ambassadors themselves stepped in and brought the deposed ministers
back again. American Consul Cole at Archangel, reporting
on the reception of British General Poole and the Allied
troops, remarked ((the working class was conspicuously absent." Thereafter Allied troops under the British General
Ironside took part in shooting and imprisoning loyal Soviet
workers. The interventionists supported a local White army
under command of General Miller, which was supposed to
join forces with Kolchak. By October 10 Ambassador Francis
was urging that the Allies take Petro grad and Moscow.

Enter Mannerheim-and the Germans

In considering the role of Finland during this period, it
must be remembered that after Soviet recognition of the independence of Finland early in 1918, the Finnish bourgeoisie
sought help both from the Allies and Germans in fighting its
own revolutionary workers, offering Finland as a base for antiSoviet attacks. At the end of January the Finnish Bolsheviks
were iaining control, and the British Minister to Sweden telegraphed his Government to encourage Sweden to send aid to
the Finnish reactionaries.
By February 7 well-armed White Guards, under command
of General Mannerheim, suddenly appeared all over North38

ern Finland. Shortly after, Ira Nelson Morris, American
Minister to Sweden, advocated withholding recognition of
Finnish independence since the Reds were in Helsingfors and
urged sending food tq the Northern section where the Whites
were in control.
On February 19, Ambassador Francis cabled approvingly
of Mannerheim:
((The White Guards, comprlsmg an army of patriots totalling
ahout 50,000 well-drilled and disciplined men and under command
of Mannerheim, a Russian-Finnish general distinguished in the
present and in the Russo-Japanese war, who is virtually dictator, is
in absolute control of all Finland north of line Bjorneborg-Tammerfors-Viborg. . . ."

Meantime, however, the Finnish Whites had entered into
relations with Germany. On March 11, Thornwell Haynes,
-American Consul at Helsingfors, cabled:
((According to arrangement with White Guards, Germans are
landing at Hangoe to take Helsingfors and drive Reds from Finland
ill order to restore order. German airplanes over Helsingfors."

The Germans captured Helsingfors for the Whites. Six
days later the British recognized the Finnish Government, put
into power with the bayonets of Britain's enemy. Mannerheim,
to hold German support, made this extraordinary statement:
«The Germans' victorious and mighty army landed in Finland
to help against the infamous Bolsheviks, and to help the friendship
the Finnish people have always had for the noble Kaiser and mighty
German people. . . . I greet the brave German troops and hope
that every Finn will realize the great sacrifice of the noble German
people who are helping them in an hour when every man is needed
on the Western front."

But now the Germans had no further use for Mannerheim,
who went to Stockholm to seek Allied support. ·Wrote Minister Morris from Sweden to Assistant Secretary of State
Polk, on June 14:
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~(General Mannerheim has severed his connections with the Finnish Government. . . . He states that with the German situation
in Finland what it is he does not desire personally to live there.
In future it may he well to bear this in min4 should some opportune
time come in which General Mannerheim could be of service to us."

A few weeks later, Morris telegraphed again:
CCI have had several conferences with General Mannerheim.
Regarding intervention in Russia he felt that this was the correct
dUng to do. . . ."

Mannerheim and the Allies
But the path of intervention was not entirely smooth.
Haynes noted in alarm the pro-Bolshevik sentiment among
the Finns, and reported that the withdrawal from production
of 75,000 Red prisoners (the work of that great patriot Mannerheim) accentuated famine conditions. In Novembe.r, however, he was advocating recognition of Mannerheim as Regent
of a new government.
CCNotwithstanding the increasing peril of Bolshevism," he wrote
on N o~mber 12, ccFinland under the new regime hopes to be able
to defend itself on the eastern frontier if the United States will
help it. • . . It seems advisable that naval and military forces be
ready to come at the earliest opportunity."

The war between the Allies and Germany came to an end.
The undeclared war on the Soviets went on. On November
16 Haynes reported:
uAccording to a decision reached yesterday, the Senate and the
Diet have agreed to entrust General Mannerheim with the forming
of a new government . . . . New general elections are fixed hy Fehruary or March, by which time it is hoped that the Entente will he
able to cope with the Bolshevik danger, which has been- hitherto
the principal objection to leaving existing mooted questions to the
decision of the people. . . ."

On November 22, Mr. Polk notified Haynes that although
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the Department was not yet ready to recognize Finland's independence, 5,000 tons of food were on their way to Mannerheim. At that very time Mannerheim was involved with a
certain T repov in a plot to make Grand Duke Alexander
Mikhailovich Tsar of Russia. Morris, Minister to Sweden,
reported on December 16 to the Secretary of State:
Through Mannerheim's m·ediation Trepov received 500,000
marks in advance from the Finnish treasury and it was planned he
would follow Mannerheim's troops on entering Petrograd. In compensation Finland was to receive Karelia and would 'be guaranteed
that Aland would not be ceded to Sweden. . . ."
tt •
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On October 12, a month before the armistice, Whitehouse,
the American Charge in Stockholm, indicated how much
greater was Allied hostility to the Bolsheviks than to their
ene~y Germany:
ttIt is the opinion of those American, English and French officials
with whom I have talked that the departure of the German and
Austrian troops from the Baltic provinces and Ukraine would lead
immediately to disturbances and shortly thereafter to Bolshevik
intervention. In the event of an armistice with the Central Powers
it would seem, therefore, advisable not to insist on the immediate
evacuation of these territories until we are in a position to send
Allied troops. There can be no doubt that the Bolshevik cause would
be greatly strengthened by the evacuation of these territories and
the task of restoring Russia correspondingly more difficult. . . ."

With the signing of the armistice, the pretext of Allied occupation of Archangel for the purpose of protecting Allied
supplies from falling into the hands of the Germans was removed, but the Allied troops continued their undeclared war
on the Soviets. By now, according to Poole, American Charge
at Archangel, there was nan obligation to the inhabitants of
this region who would be exposed if we withdrew to severe
Bolshevik reprisals . ~ . and an even more important obligation
to all Russia to protect her from economic exploitation by
. ...."
· nations
cre dItor
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Mannerheim was consolidating his rule by a terror that was
arousing indignant protest throughout the world. But this did
not deter the Allies from continuing to support him. On
February 20, 1919, Grant Smith, the American Charge in
Copenhagen, reported:
((In interview with naval attache yesterday General Mannerheim
stated that his army was willing and capable of defeating the Bolsheviki in Northern Russia. Mannerheim stated his willingness to
commence hostilities immediately if encouraged to do so by the
Allies and assured that the United States would hasten sending food
supplies to Finland."

Robert W. Imbrie, American Vice Consul at Viborg, also
urged haste. On March 2 he wrote:
((Have had several conferences with heads of Russian -Whites.
They have, with the knowledge and consent of the Finnish Government, perfected a military organization numbering 10,000 volunteers. The object of this organization is the capture of Petrograd,
and afterward Moscow and the overthrow of the Bolsheviks. . . . If
the United States Government thinks favorably of sending food in
support of the Whites, I cannot too strongly urge necessity of immediate action .... Even a -month's delay may be fatal to the project."

In due time Herbert Hoover came to the aid of Mannerheim and of the counter-revolutionary General Yudenich.
Foodstuffs stored at Reval and Viborg, sent for the relief of
starving Russian children, went to the army of intervention.

liThe Way Lies Through the Finnish Army"
On July 11 Imbrie reported:
From the Finnish-Russian 'border Petrograd was menaced
with an advance and in the opening days of the month a volunteer
Finnish army advancing into Karelia took Olonetz and threatened
Petrograd from the north. . . . Early in May the Russian White
detachment which had originated in Pskov . . . advanced in the
direction of Petrograd finally stopping at Gatchina, 45 versts southwest of the city. . . . They were, however, without sufficient food
tt • • •
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. . . the force therefore ceased its advance, merely taking steps to
protect its flanks. In this latter operation Krasnaya Gorka, on the
Finnish Gulf, was, with the assistance .of the British fleet, captured .
. . . There remains, however, one way, aside from a campaign by
an international expeditionary force in which the capture of Petrograd and the consequent overthrow of the Bolsheviks may be accomplished. This way lies through the Finnish army."

Imbrie outlined the plan:

(c. ..

The Finnish Government is aware that its political salvation is dependent upon the overthrow of the Bolsheviks before its
own country becomes impregnated with the leprosy of Bolshevism.
It is aware that its economic salvation is contingent upon the opening up of Russia so that what is now the closed door of Finland may
become the open front door. . . . From sources so high that they
may almost be considered official, I have been informed that the
Finnish Government only awaits the sanction of the Allied Governments to launch its attack.
((An agreement has been reached hetween the Russian Whites,
under which General Yudenich, representing the Kolcha:k Government,_and the Finns are willing to attack. What these terms are, I
have been unable to ascertain, but in all probability they embrace
the granting of an open, ice-free port to Finland in the White Sea
and possibly the cession of the west shore of Lake Onega.
((The Finnish army is quite capable of taking p.etrograd and ~o
time seems as propitious as the present. If the Bolsheviks are not
crushed this summer their strength and prestige will be increased
not only in Russia hut in contiguous countries. Certainly it may be
expected that Finland may very well fall under the disease. . . .
((I trust the Department may not consider it ' presumptuous on
my part to point out, for I feel it my duty to do so, that the consummation of this condition may be effected, as I have indicated,
without the loss of a single American life or the expenditure of a
single American dollar, by giving sanction to the advance of the
Finnish forces and that I may be permitted to urge that such sanction and approval be communicated by our Government to the Finnish Government."

Permission to launch the attack here outlined came from
the American Peace Mission at Versailles. On July 16 a cable
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from the Mission requested the Allied representative at Helsingfors ((To inform the Government of General Mannerheim
that in case he thought he ought to follow up the request for
action of Admiral Kolchak, the Allied Governments, without
bringing any pressure on the Finnish Government, would have
no objection to raise against this operation...."
On .August 16 Imbrie reported that the British had loaned
£6,000,000 to the Finnish Government on condition that
the Finns should mobilize for an offensive on Petrograd.
Secretary of State Lansing gave his blessing to the whole
affair in a message to the Charge in Russia, on September 4:
((Regard with deep and sympathetic interest efforts now being
made by . . . elements associated with Admiral Kolchak, and is
hopeful that means will develop by which Russia may be assisted
toward a happy outcome of the efforts of her people to regam
control of their own affairs [sic]."

Armed Intervention Fails

Intervention failed in its counter-revolutionary designs.
Mutinies were spreading among Allied troops. White Generals were everywhere meeting defeat. The bulk of the American forces were withdrawn from Archangel in July, 1919,
and the British forces withdrew during August and September; but the anti-Soviet intrigues went on.
No longer able to rely upon their own war-weary soldiers
the imperialist powers now had to be content with building
up bases in the Baltic states against the time when a more
active intervention could be resumed, with backing the Polish
attack and supporting the counter-revolutionary remnants
still to be found within Russia. On January 2, 1920, a conference was held in Helsingfors of representatives of the Finnish, Polish, Lithuanian and Esthonian Governments to consider ((their mutual interests." When the Finnish Minister
in Washington inquired of Breckinridge Long, Assistant Secretary of State, what support could be expected from America,
Long reported his reply:
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((1 told him . . . that he might feel that the Government of the
United States viewed sympathetically any action which the Government of Finland might take which would react to strengthening
that government, and which might also act as a barrier against the
spread of Bolshevism."

The role of England and Finland was analyzed by Lenin
in his speech on December 1, 1920, at the Eighth All-Russian
Congress of Soviets:
((Chu.rchill, who is pursuing a policy similar to that pursued by
Nicholas Romanov, wants to fight and is fighting, and is completely
ignoring Parliament; he boasted that he would mobilize fourteen
states against Russia-this was in 1919-he would take Petrograd
in September and Moscow in December. He was a little too loud
in his boastings. He staked everything on the fact that everywhere
in these small states there is a hatred for Russia, but he forgot that
these small states clearly understand who Yudenich, Kolchak and
Denikin are. There was a time when they were a ·few weeks removed
from complete victory. During Yudenich's advance, when he was
not far from Petrograd, the Times, the richest English newspaper,
published a leading article-l myself read this leading article-in
which it begged, ordered and demanded of Finland: Help Yudenich,
the eyes of the whole world are turned upon you, you will save
liberty, civilization and culture throughout the world-march against
the Bolsheviks! This was England speaking to Finland-England
who has the whole of Finland in its pocket, England speaking to
Finland who is up to her neck in deht, who does not even dare to
squeak, because without England she has not enough bread to last
her a week. . . ." (Lenin on Britain, page 186.)

Against the time when intervention could be tried again,
a British military mission, headed by General Kirke of the
British Army Staff, visited the Helsinki Government in 192425. The purpose of the visit was joint supervision, with General Mannerheim, of the construction of the present cCMannerheim line" of fortresses and trenches along the coast of Finland and the Isthmus of Karelia, facing the Soviet Union.
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The Intervention Conspiracies of 1927-1930
In the trial of the leaders of the so-called Industrial Party
in 1930 there came to light details of new Franco-British plans
for armed intervention, originally set for 1928, then postponed to 1930 and _again postponed to 1931. Here, again,
Finland figures conspicuously.
The Industrial Party consisted of a small group of intellectuals who had never accepted the Revolution. Because of
their technical training, many had been given important positions in the State Planning Commission and in various industrial commissariats. Here they organized a counter-revolutionary group and attempted to lay the groundwork for a counterrevolutionary attempt, by widespread sabotage and wrecking
activities. Realizing that the Soviet State could not be destroyed from within, they began, in 1927, to make contacts
with the interventionists, through a group of former Russian
industrialists known as the T orgprom, living in France. By
these gentlemen they were put in touch with the British and
French general staffs and British capitalists, among them representatives of Vickers, the munitions manufacturers, and
the oil magnate, Deterding. From these sources, the conspirators obtained funds to finance their wrecking activities
and received instructions for the correlation of their counterrevolutionary work with the interventionist plans. They also
acted as espionage agents, transmitting military information.
Ramzin, the leader of the Industrial Party, testified that in
1927 cC very active communication set in with the White
"emigres as to the organization of intervention and its proxim- .
-ity, in so far as it was set for 1928." R~mzin testified further:
UAt the audiences which Poincare granted to the members of the
Torgprom, he expressed complete sympathy with the idea of organ-izing intervention against the U.S.S.R. and stated that this question
.had already been turned over to the French General Staff to be
'worked out. . . . Further in this report Denisov [one of the Torgprom group] stated that a special commission of the French General
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Staff, headed by Colonel Joinville, to organize intervention against
the U.S.S.R., already existed. • . . There were also representatives
from the British General Staff. . . .
(tIt was pointed out that Franc~ herself did not propose to intervene with military forces; at the most she would furnish military
instructors, perhaps the help of the naval and air fleets, and that
the real military forces . . . would be those of Poland, Rumania
and the Baltic border states. Further, hope was given of the use of
White emigrant forces, that is, the Wrangel army which was
maintained abroad."

Ramzin further described the nature of the assistance which
was to come from Britain: ~~England, apart from some fin1.t'cial help, ... was supposed to lend assistance through its fleet
in the Black Sea and in the Gulf of Finland."
Planning Provocations

Methods for working up war sentiments against the Soviet
Union and the provocation of an incident which would provide the immediate pretext for hostilities were fully worked
out. Yurovsky, one of the conspirators, testified:
((The immediate grounds for the beginning of military operations,
according to their plans, were to be such circumstances as the agitation of the Communist Intcrnational-either in European countries
during seme labor movement, or in colonial ceuntries, er some
reference to the inacceptability of the cemmercial pelicy of the
U.S.S.R . . . . It was stressed that the Soviet Gevernment must bear
the entire respensibility fer everything ascribed to. the Communist
International, and of which the latter was accused."

Another witness, Osdachy, threw more light on the role in
which the Anglo-French imperialists had cast Finland.
HOf the border states, Finland was definitely referred to as a country aggressively inclined against the Seviet Union and which had
apparently great experience in provoking all kinds of frontier incidents . . . . My impression was that it was mainly in Finland that
provocative action was to be' taken, such as weuld supply a pretext
for intervention."
t7
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The interventionist plan included not only the restoration of
capitalism but the dismemberment of the Soviet State among
the participants. Y urovsky testified:
«On the part of Rumania, the official recognition by the future
Government of Russia of the annexation of Bessarabia by Rumania,
as well as a demand to cede Odessa with certain adjoining territories.
Poland demanded part of the Ukraine on the right bank of the
Dnieper, as well as part of White Russia. Esthonia and Latvia advanced a demand for such a rectification of the frontier as would
materially increase their respective territories. So far as Finland
was mentioned, there was talk 0f adding to it a part of Karelia/'

The trials of 1936, 1937 and 1938 revealed what other
tools the imperialists were willing to use. Thus with the
coming to power of Hitler in Germany and a fascist-military
clique in Japan, the job of overthrowing the Socialist State
and restoring capitalism in the Soviet Union was taken over
by these powers, with British and French connivance.
The trials revealed in full detail how Trotsky and the
Bukharinites became the servants of fascism in preparing for
military intervention. Their long list of crimes had a single
objective: to undermine the defensive power of the country
and open the borders to the invader. The plans for intervention not only contemplated the restoration of capitalism but
the dismemberment ef the Soviet Union as well. Japan was
to receive the Soviet Maritime Region; Soviet Byelo-Russia
was to go to the Poles; Germany was to get the Ukraine.
Finland, obviously, would come in for her share of the booty.
The exposure of the conspiracy, and the execution of the
traitors robbed the fascist adventurers of the internal support
upon which they had been reckoning. This together with the
growth of Soviet strength to proportions which, as the J apanese learned, spelled certain defeat for an invader, forced the
fascists to abandon their interventionist plans. Hitler turned
from the Soviet Union to easier pickings.
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Finland as the Gateway of Intervention
That world imperialism today, as in 1919, counts on Finland as its gateway to the Soviet Union, is revealed indisput~bly in the authoritative British bulletin The Week of
December 6, which says:
((It had been supposed not only in London but in Stockholm and
Helsinki that ther-e was time, at least until spr;ng, in which to
(prepare the position' for a larg~-scale showdt)wn on the Soviet
proposals to Finland. There is no question that ;f~ Scandinavia and
London alike-and apparently in Washington too-information
from agents has been to the effect that the Commun~sts would (pIa)'
it slow,' would be alarmed at the possible (repercussions of world
opinion' and would therefore be unable to take violent action to
close the Gulf of Finland until spring.
((This (preparation for position' is confirmed particularly in Sweden: for it was hoped-and with some reason-that by spring it
would be possihle to have secured a government in Sweden which
would be willing to act against the Soviet Union and-more important still-it was believed- that by then, American aid to Sweden in
military action against the Soviet Union would be secured.
(CIt is important to note, even twenty-four hours before the Soviet
move, that well-informed Conservative circles in London were offering even money on the proposition that Sweden and the United
States could be militarily and financially aligned against the Soviet
Union's proposals. And these proposals ' were of a particularly alarming nature, inasmuch as their success would profoundly change the
world power position by removing the possibility of a direct threat
by the CCapitalist World' to one of the principal industrial regions
of the (Communist World.' . . .
((There was a moment of acute nervousness when Paasikivi, then
the Finnish delegate to Moscow negotiations, was discovered to be
willing to reach an agreement on Soviet terms . . . . The appointment of M. Tanner . . . was made with the object of (stiffening'
the Finnish delegation and reversing the position reached by PaasikivL
((That having been accomplished, it was thought a long period of
diplomatic and financial pressure by the Russians would set in and
last all winter, the Helsinki Government in the meantime receiving
increasing support from the United States.
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((The suddenness of the Russian move, t.herefore, dislocated all
plans-diplomatic and otherwis,e -based on this assumption. It also
seems probable that it was responsible for the lack of coordination
in Western ' propaganda on the matter. For instance, while sonie
British and American newspapers were freely reporting the (massacre
of civilians' in Helsinki, neither the correspondent of the London
Times, the cor~e'sp'ondents of Swiss newspapers nor the official Finnish radio stadon in Lahti at that time said anything about the
matter at all, though some of them got into line later."

The Anti-Soviet Drive Today
'A dd the mad hysteria being whipped up against the Soviet
Union all over the world. Add copious evidence from Britain
of efforts to patch up peace with Germany and make common
cause against the Soviet Union. Add the American credits to
Finland-th~t great humanitarian Herbert Hoover's appeals
for food-the eagerness in all quarters ' to supply arms and
munitions , to the Finns. Add the falsification of the news
from Finland, the war-inciting editorials in all the papers,
and especially the New York Herald Tribune-Ult is idle to
suppose we 'can save either Finland or civilization from Stalinism with moral indignation and a few pennies' worth of
credits." Add the British pawns in the Ryti Cabinet and
((Butcher" Mannerheim, and the picture is complete.
But the Soviet Union has moved to put an end to intervention forever, to erect indestructible safeguards over the
precious structure of its Socialist State, and to keep unharmed in the world the pattern of a new society that has
forever ended human exploitation.
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DOCUMENTS OF THE CRISIS
SOVIET NOTES TO FINLAND
We publish below two notes issued by the Soviet Government in
the days immediately preceding the crisis with Finland, and referred
to in Molotov's broadcast of November 29.
The text of the November 26 note of
M. Molotov to the Finnish Government, protesting border provocations, is as follows:
Mr. Minister, according to a report of the General Staff of the
Red Army today, November 26, at 3:45 P.M., our troops, stationed
on the Isthmus of Karelia at the Finnish border near the village of
Manila, were suddenly subjected to artillery fire from Finnish territory.
Altogether seven shots were fired as a result of which three Red
Army men .and one junior commander were killed and seven Red
Army men and two commanders wounded. Soviet troops, having .
received strict orders not to give way to provocation, refrained from
opening fire in reply.
In informing you of this, the Soviet Government deems it necessary to emphasize that already during l'ecent negotiations with
Messrs. Tanner and Paasikivi, the Soviet Government pointed out
the danger created by the concentration of large numbers of Finnish
regular troops at the very frontier near Leningrad.
At present, in connection with provocative artillery fire from
Finnish territory on Soviet tr·oops, the Soviet Government is constrained to place on record that concentration of Finnish troops near
Leningrad not only creates a menace for Leningrad, but in actual
fact, represents a hostile act against the U.S.S.R. and has already led
to attack on Soviet troops and to loss of life.
The Soviet Government does not intend to place undue emphasis
upon this provocative act of attack by Finnish army units, who are
perhaps. not under proper discipline. But it would not wish similar
provocative acts to occur in the future.
In view of this, the Soviet. Government, in registering its determined protest in connection with this occurrence, proposes to the
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Finnish Government that it immediately withdraw its troops further
from the frontier on the Isthmus of Karelia, for a distance of 25
kilometers and thus avert the possibility of a repetition of these
provocations.

•
The text of the November 28 note of v. M. Molotov to the
Finnish Government denou,ncing the Soviet-Finnish Non-Aggression
Pact is as follows:
Mr. Minister, the reply of the Government of Finland to the note
of the Soviet Government is a document reflecting the profound
hostility of the Government of Finland toward the Soviet Union,
and is calculated to carry to extremes the crisis in the relations between the two countries.
1. The denial by the Government of Finland of the outrageous
shelling of Soviet troops by Finnish troops which resulted in victims
cannot be explained except by a desire to lead astray public opinion,
and cast derision upon the victims of the fi'ring. Only the absence of
a sense of responsibility and a contemptuous attitude toward public
opinion could explain this shocking incident as artillery salvos fired
in the course of ((training drills" of Soviet troops very near the
frontier line, before the eyes of Finnish troops.
2. The refusal of the Government of Finland to withdraw the troops
responsible for the villainous shelling of Soviet troops, together with
the demand for the simultaneous withdrawal of Finnish and Soviet
troops, formally proceeding from the principle of equality on both
sides, betray the hostile desire of the Government of Finland to keep
Leningrad under threat. In reality we do not here have equality in
positions of Finnish troops and Soviet troops, but, on the contrary,
an advantageous position for the Finnish troops. Soviet troops
menace no vital centers of Finland, being removed from these centers
for hundreds of kilometers; while Finnish troops, stationed 32 kilometers [about 20 miles] from Leningrad-a vital center of the
'U.S.S.R. with a population of 3,500,000----constitute an immediate
threat to it. Properly speaking, there is no room for withdrawal of
Soviet troops since their withdrawal would mean stationing them in
the Leningrad suburbs which is obviously absurd from the viewpoint
of the security of Leningrad. The proposal of the Soviet Government regarding the withdrawal of the Finnish troops twenty to
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twenty-five kilometers constitutes a minimum; since its purpose is not
to eliminate this inequality in the positions of the Finnish and Soviet
troops but only to reduce it to some extent. If the Government of
Finland declines even this minimum proposal that means that it
intends to keep Leningrad directly menaced by its troops.
3. By conc,e ntrating large forces of its regular troops and thus
placing under immediate- threat a most important vital center of the
U.S.S.R. the Government of Finland has committed a hostile act
against the U.S.S.R. incompatible with the non-aggression pact concluded hetwe·en the two countries. Moreover by refusing to withdraw
its troops at least twenty to twenty-five kilometers, following the
villainous shelling of Soviet troops hy Finnish troops, the Government of Finland has shown that it continues to maintain a hostile
attitude toward the U.S.S.R. and does not intend to pay regard to the
provisions of the non-aggression pact, and has decided to keep
Leningrad under threat in the future as well. However the Government of the U.S.S.R. cannot reconcile itself to a situation where
only one side would undertake to carry out this pact. In view of this
the Soviet Government deems itself compelled to state that from
this date it considers itself free from obligations undertaken under
the non-aggression pact concluded between the U.S.S.R. and Finland. Accept, Mr. Minister, assurance of my perfect respect.

MOLOTOV'S BROADCAST TO THE SOVIET PEOPLE
At midnight, Noyember 29, Viacheslay Molotoy, Chairman of the
Co~ncil of People's Commissars of the U.S.S.R. and People's Commissar for Foreign Affairs, broadcast the following speech:
Men and women, citizens of the Soviet Union, the hostile policy
pursued hy the present Government of Finland towards our country
.compels us to take immediate measures to insure the external security of our State.
You know that in the course of the past two mQnths, the Soviet
Government has patiently conducted negotiations with the Government of Finland concerning proposals which, in the present alarming
international situation, it regarded as the minimum essential for
insuring the security of our country and especially for the security of
Leningrad.
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In these negotiations the Government of Finland adopted an attitude of irreconcilable hostility towards our country: Instead of finding ground for agreement in a friendly manner, the present rulers of
Finland, to please the foreign imperialists who instigate hostility
towards the Soviet Union, t..:>ok a different course.
Despite all the concessions we made, the negotiations ended without yielding any result. The consequences of. this are now known. In
recent days abominable provocations have been initiated by the
Finnish militarists on the frontier between the Soviet Union and
Finland, including even artillery firing on our troops near Leningrad,
which caused grave losses in the Red Army units.
Attempts of our Government to forestall repetition of these provocations by means of practical proposals addressed to the Government
of Finland, far from finding any support, again met with the
hostile policy of the ruling circles of Finland. As you know from
yesterday's note of the Soviet Government, they replied to our proposals by a hostile refusal and a brazen denial of the facts, by a
derisive attitude toward the victims we have lost and by undisguised
striving to continue to keep Leningrad under the immediate threat of
their troops' in the future.
AU this has definitely shown that the present Government of Finland, which became entangled in its anti-Soviet ties with the imperialists, does not wish to maintain normal relations with the Soviet
Union. It continues in its hostile attitude towards our country and
has no wish to pay due regard to the provisions of the non-aggression
pact concluded between our countries. It desires to keep our glorious
Leningrad under military threat. From such a Government and from
its thoughtless military clique, we can now expect only fresh, insolent
provocations.
The Soviet Government 'was therefore compelled yesterday to
declare that henceforth it considered itself free from the obligations
undertaken under the non-aggression pact concluded l:>etween the
U.S.S.R. and Finland, and violated in an irresponsible manner by
the Government of Finland. In view of the fresh attacks of the Finnish military units on Soviet troops at the Soviet-Finnish frontier,
the Government has now been compelled to adopt new decisions.
The Government can no longer tolerate the present situation, responsibility for which fully rests with the Government of Finland. The
Government of the U.S.S.R. has arrived at the conclusion that it
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can no longer maintain normal relations with the Government of
Finland and has therefore found it necessary immediately to recall
its political and econ omic representatives from Finland. ' Along with
this, the Government bas given orders to the Chief Command of
Red Army and Navy to be ready for any surprise and immediately to check possible fresh sallies on the part of the Finnish
military clique.
The hostile foreign press asserts that the measures being taken
by us are aimed at the seizure of Finnish territory or its annexation
to the U.S.S.R. This is malicious slander. The Soviet Government
has had no such intentions. More than that, if Finland herself pursued a friendly po~icy towards the Soviet Union, the Soviet Government, which always strove for friendly relations with Finland,
would he ready to meet her half-way in regard to territorial concessions on the part of the U.s.S.R. Under this condition the Soviet
Government would be ready to consider favorably even such a question as the question of re-uniting the Karelian people inhabiting the
main districts of present Soviet Karelia with kindred Finnish people
in a single and independent Finnish State. For this, however, it is
necessary that the Government of Finland should maintain not a
hostile but a friendly attitude toward the U.S.S.R., which would
correspond to the vital interests of both states.
Others assert that measures carried out by us are aimed agawt
Finland's independence, or at interference in her internal and external affairs. This is equally malicious slander. Irrespective of the
regime existing in Finland, we consider her an independent and
sovereign state in her external and internal policies. We firmly hold
that the Finnish people should itself decide its internal and external
affairs in the manner it deems necessary.
At the proper time the peoples of the Soviet Union did what
was necessary for the creation of an independent Finland. The pe0ples of our country are ready also in the future to render the Finnish
. people assistance in assuring its free and independent development.
The Soviet Union has equally no intention of prejudicing to any
extent the interests of other states in Finland. Questions of the relations between Finland and other states are the exclusive concern of
Finland herself, and the Soviet Union does not consider itself entitled
to interfere in this matter. The only purpose of our measures is to
insure the security of the Soviet Union and especially of Leningrad

"

with its population of 3,500,000. In the present international atmosphere, heated by war, we cannot make the solution of this vital and
urgent state problem dependent on the ill-will of the present FinDish rulers.
This problem will have to be solved by the efforts of the Soviet
Union itself in friendly cooperation with the Finnish people. We
have no doubt that a favorable solution of the problem of insuring
the security of Leningrad will provide the foundation for an indeItrUctible friendship between the U.S.S.R. and Finland.
DECLARATION OF PEOPLE'S GOVERNMENT OF FINLAND

Following is the text, as published by Tass, official Russian News
Agency, of the declaration issued December 1 by the People's Go'Y~ment of the Democratic Republic of Finland (recei'Yed in M osCOW by radio and translated from Finnish).
By the will of the people, indignant at the criminal policy of the
contemptible Government of Cajander, Erkko and Tanner, a new
government of our country-the People's Provisional Governmentwas formed today in Eastern Finland.
This Government hereby calls the entire Finnish people to a determined struggle for the overthrow of the tyranny of hangmen and
war provocateurs. The reactionary, avid plutocracy which in 1918,
aided by the troops of foreign imperialists, drowned the democratic
ftt-edom of the Finnish toiling people in a sea of blood, transformed
our country into a White-Guard hell for toilers.
I-laving sold the interests of the country's independence, the pluto.
crane rulers of Finland, jointly with all kinds of imperialist enemies
of the Finnish and Soviet peoples, ceaselessly hatched plans of antiSoviet war provocations and finally plunged our country into the
furnace of war against the Socialist Soviet Union-the great friend
of the Finnish people.
In this critical situation wide masses of the Finnish toiling people,
who always desired and desire to live in peace with the peoples of
the country of the Soviets, consider it their elementary right and
th -ir sacred duty to take the fate of the fatherland into their own
tt f iable hands.
The people have already risen in various parts of the country and
proclaimed the formation of a Democratic People's Republic. Part
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of the soldiers of Finland's army already have sided with the new
Government, backed by the people.
The Soviet Union, which never threatened or disturbed Finland,
which always respected her independence and for some twenty years
tolerated vile war provocations on the part of adventurist rulers of
White Finland, has now been confronted with the necessity of putting an end to these threats to its independence, by the forces of
the Red Army.
This aim also fully corresponds with the vital interests of our
people. That is why the· masses of the people of Finland meet and
welcome the valiant and invincible Red Army with tremendous enthusiasm, being aware that it is marching to Finland not as a conqueror but as a friend and liberator of our people.
The People's Government of Finland, being deeply convinced that
the Soviet Union pursues no aims directed against the independence
of our country, fully approves and supports actions by the Red Army
on the territory of Finland. It regards them as invaluable assistance
to the Finnish people on the part of the Soviet Union for the purpose of eliminating as soon as possible by joint efforts the most
dangerous seat of war created in Finland by the criminal government of war provocateurs.
.
To accomplish this task as early as possible, the People's Government of Finland invites the Governm,e nt of the U.S.S.R. to
render the Democratic Republic of Finland all necessary assistance
by the Red Army forces.
For participation in a joint struggle, hand in hand with the heroic
Red Army of the U.S.S.R., the People's Government of Finland
already has formed the First Finnish Army Corps, which in the
course of forthcoming battles will receive reinforcements by volunteers coming from revolutionary workers and farmers and must become the strong backbone of the future People's Army of Finland.
To the First Finnish Army Corps is accorded the honor of bringing
the banner of Finland's Democratic Republic into the capital and
hoisting it on the roof of the Presidential Palace to the joy of the
working people and to the awe of the enemies of the people.
Our State must he a democratic republic serving the interests of
the people, unlike the plutocratic republic of Cajander and Erkko,
serving the interests of the capitalists and landlords.
However, our State is not a State of the Soviet type because the
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Soviet regime cannot be estahlished by the efforts of the government
alone without the consent of the whole people, in particular the
farmers. In conformity with the above, our government is a People's.
Government of the Democratic Republic of Finland. It will rely
for support on the broad people's front of toilers.
The People's Government in its present composition regards itself
as a provisional government. Immediately upon its arrival in Helsinki, capital of the country, it will be reorganized and its composition enlarged hy the inclusion of representatives from various parties and groups participating in the people's front of toilers. Thefinal composition of the people's government, its powers and actions,.
are to he sanctioned by a Diet elected on the basis of universal,.
equal and direct suffrage, with the secret ballot.
The People's Government of Finland regards as its primary task
the overthrow of the government of the Finnish White Guards, therout of its armed forces, the conclusion of peace and the ensuring.
of independence and security to Finland by means of the establishm·e nt of lasting and friendly relations with the Soviet Union.
The People's Government of Finland addresses to the Government
of the U.S.S.R. a proposal to conclude a pact of mutual assistancebetween Finland and the Soviet Union and to comply with the ageold national hope of the Finnish people for a reunion with theKarelian people with it in a single and independent State of Finland. The People's Government of Finland has every ground to hopethat its firm course of estCllblishing friendly relations with the SovierUnion will enable the Governm·e nt of the U.S.S.R. to comply with
this proposal.
The People's Government desires to maintain friendly relations.
also with other States. It recognizes the economic and financial obligations of Finland toward other States insofar as these obligations.
do not contradict Finland's sovereignty and in so far as any of theseStates will not take hostile steps against the Democratic Republic of
Finland and its People's Government.
In its internal policy the People's Government sets itself the following tasks:
I

Creation of the People's Army of Finland.
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II

The institution of State control over large private banks and
large industrial enterprises and the realization of measures assisting
medium and small enterprises.
ill

The realization of measures for the complete elimination of unemployment.
IV

Reduction of the working day to eight hours, provIsion for a
two weeks' summer vacation for workers, and reduction of house
rents for workers and employees.
V

Confiscation of lands belonging to big landowners, without touching the lands and properties of farmers, and transfer of the confiscated land to farmers having no land or possessing small allotments.
VI

Exemption of farmers from the payment of tax arrears.
VII

State assistance in every form for the improvement of economies
for the poor farmers, in the first place by allotting to them additional land, pastures and when possible also forests for their
domestic needs, from lands confiscated from large landowners.
VIII

Democratization of Sta~e organiza~ion, administrat~on and courts.
IX

Increase of State subsidies for cultural needs and reorganization
of schools, to insure the possibility of attendance at schools to
children of workers and other needy people; also provisions of every
form for the development of public education, science, literature
and the arts in a progressive spirit.
It turns out that the plutocratic government of Ca jander and
Erkko was hated hy the people, a government which did its utmost
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to ruin our country, resigned to having lost all the support of the
people. This hated 'government was replaced by Tanner's Government, but Tanner is an enemy of our people like Cajander. Tanner's
Government is not a single jot better, if not worse, than Cajander's
Government.
Chase these hangmen as far as possible from Finland; throw off
this entire bankrupted Government gang!
Arise, long-suffering, toiling people of Finland! Rise to the courageous fi~ht against the tyranny of your oppressors and hangmen!
Arise, all citizens to whom the future of our country is dear! Let
us throw off the black load of reaction from the shoulders of our
people! Let us clear the road for the progress, welfare and culture
of the people, for the realization of the age-old national aspirations
of our people! May the cause of the workers, peasants and working
intelligentsia of Finland triumph!
Under the banner of a free and independent democratic republic
of Finland, onward to victories!
OTTO KUUSINEN, Chairman of the People's Government and Minister of Foreign Affairs of Finland.
MAURITZ ROSENBERG, Assistant Chairman of the
People's Government and Minister of Finance.
AKSEL ANTTILLA, Minister of Defense.
TU,URE LEHEN, Minister of Internal Affairs.
ARMAS E]KI] A, Minister of Agriculture.
INKORI LEHTINEN, Minister of Education.
PAAVO PROKKONEN, Minister of Karelian Affairs.
The Town of Terioki, December 1, 1939.

NOTES ON MEMBERS OF THE PEOPLE'S GOVERNMENT
The availahle hiographical data on members of the new Finnish
People's Government, established in T erioki, shows them to he 'men
and women who have worked devotedly at the risk of livelihood
and life, in the interests of the Finnish working class.
Its Premier and Foreign Minister, Otto W. Kuusinen, became
active in the Finnish Social-Democratic Party after the Revolution
of 1905, and at various periods was a member of its Central Committee. After the October Revolution he was active in the Left
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wing of the Social-Democratic movement in Finland and later became one of the founders of the Finnish Communist Party. In the
Finnish revolution of 1918, Kuusinen was the People's Commissar of Education.
Armas Ejkija, Minister of Agriculture, was an active member of
the Young Socialist movement in Finland after the Civil War and
has won prominence in working class activities.
Inkori Lehtinen, Minister of Education, is not only herself a
veteran working class leader, but is a daughter of J. K. and Sandra
Lehtinen, well-known leaders in the Finnish working class movement
before the Civil War.
Mauritz Rosenberg, assistant-chairman and Minister of Finance,
was a locomotive engineer on the Finnish State Railway until 1918
when he was expelled for his political affiliations. Continuing his activities in the Left wing of the Finnish Socialist movement after the
Civil War he was sentenced to two years' imprisonment in 1922. He
was arrested again in 1930, during the fascist Lappo movement, and
was sentenced to seven years' imprisonment at hard la·bor. He escaped
after five years and reached the Soviet Union.

TEXT OF TREATY OF MUTUAL ASSISTANCE AND FRIENDSHIP BETWEEN THE SOVIET UNION AND THE
DEMOCRATIC REPUBLIC OF- FINLAND
The Presidium of the Supreme Soviet of the U.S.S.R. on the
one side and the Government of the Democratic Republic of Finland on the other, .being convinced that now, when the most dangerous seat of war, which had been created near the borders of the
Soviet Union by the former plutocratic power in Finland to please
the imperialist powers, is being eliminated through the heroic struggle
of the Finnish people and through the efforts of the Red Army of
the U.S.S.R., and when the Finnish people has formed its democratic republic, the time has come to establish lasting friendly relations between our countries and ensure by joint efforts the security
and inviolability of our States; recognizing that the time has come
for the realization of the age-old aspirations of the Finnish people
for reunion of the Karelian people with its kindred, the Finnish
people, in a single state of Finland, and also with a view to favorahle
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and mutual settlement of frontier problems, especially ensuring the
security of Leningrad and the southern coast of Finland; aiming to
strengthen the spirit and fundamental principles of the peace treaty
of October 23, 1920, based on the mutual recognition of State independence and non-intervention in the internal affairs of the other
party; found it necessary to conclude the following treaty of mutual
assistance and friendship hetween the Soviet Union and the Democratic Republic of Finland, and appointed for this purpose their
authorized representatives: Presidium of the Supreme Soviet of the
U.S.S.R.-Viacheslav Molotov, Chairman of the Council of People's Commissars and People's Commissar of Foreign Affairs of the
U.S.S.R.; for the People's Government of Finland-Otto Kuusinen,
Chairman of the People's Government and Minister of Foreign
Affairs of Finland, and these authorized representativ,es upon mutual
presentation of their credentials found in due form and good
order, agreed on the following:
ARTICLE I

In token of the friendship and the profound confidence of the
Soviet Union in the Democratic Republic of Finland, and meeting
the national aspirations of the Finnish people for the reunion of the
Karelian people with the Finnish people in a single and independent
State of Finland, the Soviet Union expresses consent to the transfer
to th~ Democratic Republic of Finland the districts of Soviet
Karelia with a predominating Karelian population-amounting altogether to 70,000 square kilometers-which territory will be included
into the State territory of the Democratic Republic of Finland.
The frontier line between the U.S.S.R. and the Democratic Republic of Finland is to be established in accordance with the appended
map. In token of the friendship and the profound confidence of the
Democratic Republic of Finland in the U.S.S.R. and meeting the
desires of the Soviet Union concerning the consolidation and security
of the U.S.S.R. and especially of the city of Leningrad, the Democratic Republic of Finland expresses its consent to a certain shifting
of the frontier on the Isthmus of Karelia northward from Leningrad and to the transfer to the Soviet Union territory amounting
to 3,970 square kilometers, while the U.S.S.R. considers itself
obliged to compensate Finland for the cost of sections of railway
lines on the territory of the Karelian Isthmus which is to be trans62

ferred to the U.S.S.R. to the amount of one hundred and twenty
-million Finnish marks.
ARTICLE II

In the mutual interests of the consolidation and security of the
·U .S.S.R. and of Finland, the Democratic Republic of Finland expresses consent: firstly, to lease to the Soviet Union for 30 years the
Peninsula of Hangoe and surrounding waters in a radius five miles
southward and eastward and three miles westward and northward,
-also a number of neighboring islands in directions south and east in
accordance with the map appended hereto, for the purpose of creating there a naval base capable of protecting against aggression and
entry to the Gulf of Finland in the interests of ensuring the security
of Finland and the U.S.S.R. For the purpose of the protection of
-the naval base the Soviet Union is granted the right to maintain
-there at its own expense armed land and air forces of strictly limited strength whose maximum numbers will be determined by special
.agreement; secondly, to sell to the Soviet Union the Island of
.Suursaari (Hoagland), Seiskaari, Lavansaari, Tutersaari (small and
.big), Kojivisto (Bjorko) ' in the Gulf of Finland, also parts of the
peninsulas of Rybachj and Sredni, belonging to Finland on the
coast of the Arctic Ocean, for the agreed sum of 300,000,000 Fin·
:nish marks.
ARTICLE

m

The Soviet Union and the Democratic Republic of Finland undertake to render to each other every assistance, including military, in
-the event of an attack or threat of an attack on Finland and also
-in the event of an attack or threat of an attack on the Soviet Union
across the territory of Finland on the part of any European power.
ARTICLE IV

The contracting parties undertake not to conclude any- alliances
.and n-ot to participate in any coalitions directed against one of the
.contracting parties.
ARTICLE V

The contracting parties agree to conclude a trade treaty within
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the shortest space of time and to raise the annual trade turnover
between the two countries considerably higher than it was in 1927
when it reached a maximum figure of eight hundred million Finnish marks.
ARTICLE VI

The Soviet Union undertakes to render to the People's Army of
Finland assistance in armaments and other war materials on favorable terms.
ARTICLE VII

The term of validity of this treaty in that part referring to undertakings of mutual assistance between the U.S.S.R. and the Democratic Republic of Finland (Articles III to V) is twenty-five years,
and if one year before the expiration of this term none of the contracting parties deems it necessary to denounce provisions of this
treaty for which a definite time limit has been set, these provisions
automatically remain in force for another twenty-five years.
ARTICLE VIII

The present treaty comes into force on the date of its signing and
is subject to subsequent ratification. The exchange of instruments
of ratification will be effected within the shortest possible space of
time in the capital of Finland-the city of Helsinki. This treaty
made in two originals, in the Russian and Finnish languages, in the
city of Moscow, December 2, 1939.
Signed:
VIACHESLAV MOLOTOV,

Chairman of the Council of People's Commissars
and People's Commissar for Foreign Affairs of the
Union of Soviet Socialist Republics.
OTTO KUUSINEN,

Premier and Foreign Minister of the People's
Government of Finland.
Moscow, December 4, 1939.
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